|
| Q. |
Why is HEU (highly-enriched
uranium) a problem? |
|
| A. |
HEU is a problem because
it is the direct cause of the 2nd North
Korea nuclear crisis. The nuclear program
that North Korea allegedly admitted
to during an October 2002 visit by U.S.
Assistant Sec. of State James Kelly
involves HEU. The nuclear fuel material,
uranium, turns into plutonium after
it is used in a reactor. Therefore,
one can calculate the level of weapon-grade
plutonium extracted by examining the
operation levels of nuclear reactors.
The extraction of plutonium, which can
be monitored and controlled, does not
in itself imply intent to develop nuclear
weapons. In contrast, the production
of HEU does constitute in itself intent
to develop nuclear weapons. (☞
HEU(highly-enriched uranium))
Two main issues concerning HEU are troubling
the U.S. and North Korea.
First of all, the actual existence of
HEU or an HEU program is a topic of
debate. The U.S. claims that it has
sufficient evidence and that North Korea
also privately admitted to the program’s
existence in October 2002. However,
the U.S. has been refusing to disclose
the evidence while North Korea claims
that it never admitted to pursuing such
a program.
Second, North Korea’s motive to develop
nuclear weapons is questionable. Previously,
North Korea’s claim that it would use
nuclear technology only for energy generation
and other peaceful purposes was a matter
of debate. North Korea has now made
its possession of nuclear weapons explicit.
As serious as the situation is, the
HEU allegations are not a debatable
matter at this point. However, they
will become a debatable issue during
the process to resolve North Korea nuclear
issue, especially in connection with
Pyongyang’s twin liabilities: its previous
violation of the Geneva Agreement and
the ensuing criticism from the international
community. |
|
 |
|
|
| Q. |
What is the extent
of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities? |
|
| A. |
North Korea is believed
to have considered developing nuclear
weapons from as early as the 1950s.
In the 1960’s, following the installation
of a research-purpose nuclear reactor,
North Korea received technical assistance
from the Soviet Union to build large-scale
nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. North
Korea experts and know-how on nuclear
technology were nurtured here. North
Korea holds a particularly advantageous
position for developing nuclear technology,
as it has mines capable of producing
4 million tons of high-grade uranium.
Through independently-conducted research
focused on the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e.,
nuclear fuel refining & transformation)
and manufacturing technologies, in the
1970s North Korea succeeded in upgrading
the capacity of its research-purpose
nuclear reactor. North Korea then began
construction of a 5 MW-class research-purpose
reactor (the 2nd reactor) in the 1980s.
It began operating uranium refineries
and transformation facilities in 1986,
and started building a 200MW-class nuclear
power plant at Taechon in 1989. In addition,
it focused on acquiring the facilities
needed for the practical use of nuclear
energy as well as weapons development
through building massive reprocessing
facilities in Yongbyon. North Korea
is believed to have successfully completed
the nuclear fuel cycle (from obtaining
nuclear fuels to reprocessing) by the
1990’s. However, it is difficult to
determine with certainty whether it
has actually acquired nuclear weapons
capabilities. This is because the development
and testing of detonation devices (which
requires highly sophisticated technology)
has not yet been confirmed; similarly
unconfirmed is the status of North Korea’s
development of a suitable projectile
for nuclear weapons (missile range,
capability to mount nuclear warheads,
etc.). However, considering its plutonium
extraction abilities, it is almost certain
that North Korea is capable of producing
simple nuclear weapons. One cannot rule
out the possibility that such weapons
already have been produced. Although
the scarcity of information leads experts
to draw different conclusions, the general
view is that North Korea holds one or
two, and possibly as many as seven or
eight, nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, China
and Russia are publicly hesitant to
believe that North Korea holds nuclear
weapons. |
|
|
|
|
| Q. |
What is North Korea
asking for in return for giving up its
nuclear program? |
|
| A. |
North Korea’s first request
is assurances for its regime security,
while the second is economic aid. It
is uncertain as to what North Korea’s
ultimate objectives are. Although it
seems clear that North Korea hopes for
full normalization of U.S.-NK relations,
some believe that the acquisition of
nuclear capabilities is in itself an
actual strategic goal, while others
believe that the acquisition of nuclear
capabilities is only a tactical means
to achieve some other strategic goal.
Specific requests made by North Korea
can be summarized as follows:
- Certain assurance by the U.S. to not
attack North Korea (U.S.-NK Mutual Non-aggression
Pact)
- Official U.S. recognition of North
Korea regime (declassification as a
terror-sponsoring state & lifting
economic sanctions)
- Establishment of full U.S.-NK relations
(installing embassy-level contacts)
North Korea’s bitter resentment of the
Bush administration’s ‘axis of evil’
comments can be interpreted along these
lines. The logic underlying North Korea’s
request for economic aid is that giving
up its nuclear program would incur great
losses that would need to be compensated
for with energy aid. It is because of
this that the construction of light-water
reactors and the transfer of crude oil
were offered to North Korea. From North
Korea’s standpoint, the security of
its regime and economic aid must always
be considered hand in hand. Therefore,
North Korea nuclear weapons issue cannot
be solved unless both aspects are tackled
simultaneously. North Korea thus hopes
to divide the process of giving up its
nuclear program into stages, with it
being rewarded with assurances and aid
at every stage. In conclusion, because
North Korea regards the U.S. with fear
and distrust, it is reluctant to take
any action unless a credible reward
is presented first. |
|
|
|
|
| Q. |
Why is the U.S. reluctant
to engage in direct negotiations with
North Korea? |
|
| A. |
The basic U.S. position
is that there must be “no rewards for
wrong actions”. The U.S. believes that
North Korea has a serious credibility
problem, citing Pyongyang’s secret continuation
of its nuclear program even after the
announcement of the Geneva Agreement.
Therefore, Washington is unwilling to
continue negotiations unless North Korea
first gives up its nuclear program.
The U.S. position is that bilateral
U.S.-NK talks are possible only after
North Korea has given up its nuclear
program first. The U.S. also desires
the six-party talks to be a multilateral
framework through which North Korea
will be persuaded to give up its nuclear
program. Meanwhile, Washington is open
to engaging in bilateral U.S.-North
Korea negotiations so long as they take
place within the boundaries of the six-party
framework. |
|
|
|
|
| Q. |
Under what principles
are parties to the six-party talks approaching
North Korea nuclear weapons issue? |
|
| A. |
| Topic |
South
Korea |
US |
Japan |
North
Korea |
China |
Russia |
| Peaceful resolution of North
Korea nuclear issue |
Supports |
Supports |
Supports |
Supports |
Supports |
Supports |
| Denuclearization of the Peninsula |
Supports |
Supports |
Supports |
Supports |
Supports |
Supports |
| North Korea’s possession of
nuclear weapons |
Opposes |
Opposes |
Opposes |
- |
Opposes |
Opposes |
| Certainty on North Korea’s possession
of nuclear weapons |
Uncertain |
Unofficially
Believes so |
Unofficially
Believes so |
Officially
Announced |
Uncertain |
Uncertain |
| Certainty on HEU existence |
Prudent |
Certain |
Certain |
Denial |
Uncertain |
Uncertain |
| Method of negotiation |
North Korea gives
up nuclear program, while compensations
are given |
Negotiation only
after North Korea first gives
up its program |
Negotiation only
after North Korea first gives
up its program |
Words
for words,
Actions for
actions |
| Topic of six-party talks |
Nuclear Weapons |
Nuclear Weapons
Human Rights(?) |
Nuclear Weapons
Human Rights(?)
Kidnapped Japanese
|
Arms Reduction |
Nuclear Weapons
General |
Nuclear Weapons
Aid |
| Security of North Korea regime |
Provide assurances |
Provide assurances
only after North Korea first give
up its program |
Assurances only
after North Korea first give up
its program |
Prior assurances |
Prior assurances |
Prior assurances |
| Method of securing North Korea
regime |
Multilateral
signature |
Guarantee |
Guarantee |
Treaty |
Non- aggression
pact |
Multilateral
guarantee or non-aggression pact |
| Aid after North Korea gives
up nuclear program |
Full aid |
Discuss after
North Korea gives up its program |
Discuss after
North Korea gives up its program |
In stages |
Measure-for-
measure
|
Measure-for-
measure |
| Time to provide aid |
After North Korea
announcement to give up its program |
After North Korea
announcement to give up its program |
After North Korea
announcement to give up its program |
After North Korea
announcement to give up its program |
By
segments, after announcement (suspend
operation -> aid & compensation
-> dismount facilities) |
|
|
|
|
Issue
