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| Q. |
What is North Korea Nuclear
Weapons Issue? |
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| A. |
North Korea nuclear weapons
issue refers to the course of events
following the secret development of
nuclear weapons by North Korea. In the
early 90s, it was revealed that the
North Korea had attempted to develop
nuclear weapons (1st North Korea nuclear
crisis). In 1995, North Korea agreed,
after a year of negotiations with the
U.S. to halt the development of nuclear
weapons in exchange for light-water
reactors to solve its energy problem,
effectively putting an end to the 1st
crisis. However, North Korea resumed
its nuclear development program later
on, only to be discovered by the U.S.
again, leading to the 2nd North Korea
nuclear crisis. The gravity of the crisis
became apparent following the visit
to Pyongyang made in October 2002 by
U.S. Assistant Secretary. of State James
Kelly, during which North Korean authorities
allegedly admitted to having resumed
a uranium-based nuclear program. North
Korea claims that the U.S. violated
the Geneva Agreement first by delaying
the construction of the light-water
reactors, while the U.S. stresses the
fact that North Korea continued its
nuclear program even after the Agreement
was announced. |
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| Q. |
Why does North Korea persist
in developing nuclear weapons? |
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| A. |
The first and foremost
reason is to ensure the security of
North Korea regime. In general, North Korea
regards the U.S. with fear. The U.S.
is also watchful of North Korea in connection
to its support for terrorist activities,
for which reason Washington has slapped
economic sanctions on Pyongyang. Having
seen the outcomes of the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, North Korea presumes that it
is the next target on the U.S. hit list.
Therefore, North Korea is striving to develop
nuclear weapons in the hopes that this
would deter the U.S. from taking military
action. The second reason is that the
possession of nuclear weapons lends
North Korea a more advantageous position
in negotiations. The security of the
North Korea regime can be achieved purely through
the improvement of relations with the
U.S. It is the view of North Korea that
its possession of nuclear weapons will
strengthen U.S. motivation to improve
relations with North Korea. That is, the
North Korea believes that its nuclear program
is an effective way to bring the U.S.
to the negotiation table, as well as
a safeguard measure. It seems to believe
that, in addition to the security of
its regime, it will also be able to
acquire economic benefits such as various
aid programs. Therefore, one can say
that North Korea is pursuing its nuclear
program as a vital part of its key national
agenda. |
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| Q. |
Why does the U.S. intend
to deter North Korea from developing nuclear
weapons? |
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| A. |
The first reason the
U.S. intends to deter North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program is to prevent the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, while the second
is to remove the threat posed to the
U.S. The concept of nuclear non-proliferation
has recently been expanded to include
WMD (weapons of mass destruction). Following
the 9.11 attacks and the priority attached
to the ‘war on terror’, the prevention
of WMD proliferation has become an important
issue in the U.S. national security
agenda. That is, the potential destruction
that would be inflicted in the event
of a terrorist attack using nuclear
or chemical/biological weapons has made
WMD proliferation the greatest perceived
threat to U.S. national security. The
acquisition of nuclear weapons by the
North Korea, which the U.S. has already dubbed
a terror-sponsoring nation, is therefore
regarded by Washington as an unacceptable
security threat of the utmost urgency.
Moreover, with North Korea continually
striving to improve its missiles, equipping
them with longer ranges and the ability
to carry nuclear or chemical/biological
weapons, the threat as perceived by
the U.S. is made even greater. |
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| Q. |
The First North Korea Nuclear
Crisis |
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| A. |
In 1993, amid suspicions
that it was attempting to develop nuclear
weapons, North Korea withdrew from the
NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty),
sparking the 1st North Korea Nuclear
Crisis. The crisis, after nearly reaching
the brink of war in June of 1994, came
to an end following the October 1994
Geneva Agreement announced by North
Korea and the U.S. North Korea had signed
a safeguards agreement with the IAEA
in the January of 1992. As stipulated
in the agreement, the IAEA conducted
six inspections in North Korea and discovered
sufficient evidence to believe that
several kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium
had been extracted, in stark contrast
to a report North Korea submitted to
the IAEA, stating that only 90 grams
of the material had been extracted.
This result prompted the IAEA to request
a special inspection, at which North
Korea withdrew from the NPT as an act
of protest. Almost a full year of fruitless
negotiations passed, with the crisis
peaking in June 1994, when it nearly
reached the brink of war. Talks resumed
following a dramatic visit by former
U.S. President Carter, who held talks
with North Korea President Kim Il-sung.
U.S.-NK negotiations led to the Geneva
Agreement in October of 1994 negotiated
by U.S. ambassador Robert Gallucci and
North Korea Vice Foreign Minister Kang
Suk-ju. The agreement, which stipulated
that North Korea suspend its nuclear
program in exchange for fuel oil ang
two light-water reactors, effectively
concluded the 1st North Korea nuclear
crisis. |
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| Q. |
The Geneva Agreement |
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| A. |
This is the bilateral
agreement between the U.S. and North
Korea that brought about the resolution
of the 1st North Korea nuclear crisis
sparked by North Korea’s withdrawal
from the NPT in 1993. The agreement
was reached on the 21st of October,
1994 by U.S. and North Korea delegations
headed by Ambassador Robert Gallucci
and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister
Kang Suk-ju. The Agreement focuses on
North Korea’s suspension of its nuclear
program in exchange for the provision
of light-water reactors. While the Geneva
Agreement stressed the suspension of
North Korea’s nuclear program, it also
provided a general framework of U.S.-NK
relations as a means to realize this
goal. The terms of the Geneva Agreement
can be summarized as follows:
① Provision of Light-water Reactors
- The U.S. will provide North Korea
with a 2000MWe-capacity light-water
reactor power plant, as well as providing
an annual 500,000 tons of crude oil
for heating and power generation until
the construction of the plant is complete.
In exchange, North Korea shall halt
operation of its graphite-moderated
reactors and related facilities (nuclear
facilities at Yongbyon), and dismantle
them upon completion of the light-water
reactor plant.
② Normalization of U.S.-NK Political
and Economic Relations ? Within three
months of the signing of the Agreement,
the two parties shall ease trade and
investment barriers, including those
concerning communication and financial
transactions. In addition, both parties
shall open a liaison office in the other’s
capital city, and re-establish these
offices as embassies depending on the
progress of the terms of the Agreement.
③ Denuclearization and Peace of the
Korean Peninsula ? The U.S. shall not
use nor threaten the use of nuclear
force against nor threaten North Korea,
while North Korea must enact measures
to realize the denuclearization of the
peninsula in accordance with the North-South
Joint Declaration.
④ Cooperation to Strengthen the NPT
Regime ? North Korea shall remain a party
to the NPT, and shall accept nuclear
inspections by the IAEA immediately
following the signing of the ‘Light-water
Reactor Provision Pact’.
In accordance with the terms of the
Geneva Agreement, KEDO (Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization) was
established and construction of the
light-water reactors began at the Kumho
site. However, the Geneva Agreement
was effectively annulled following the
visit to North Korea by U.S. Assistant
Sec. of State James Kelly in 2003, during
which North Korea admitted upon persistent
inquiry by Kelly to having pursued a
secret nuclear weapons development program.
The U.S. claims that North Korea has violated
the Geneva Agreement by continuing its
development of nuclear weapons even
after the Agreement, while North Korea
claims that the U.S., through its failure
to construct a light-water reactor by
the year 2003 as had been promised,
caused 2 Million kilowatts of power
loss on the part of North Korea and violated
the Agreement. Such developments gave
rise to the 2nd North Korea nuclear crisis. |
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| Q. |
The Yongbyon Nuclear
Facilities |
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| A. |
The Yongbyon nuclear
facilities are the center of North Korea research
on nuclear energy. The Nuclear Energy
Research Center and nuclear-reactor
plants which started operation in 1986
are located in Yongbyon. The 5Mw-capacity
nuclear reactors in Yongbyon, which
had received extensive media coverage
in connection to North Korea nuclear weapons
issue, employ the graphite moderation
method and are fueled by natural uranium.
Because weapons-grade plutonium can
be easily extracted from these facilities,
their suspension was stipulated in the
Geneva Agreement. Facilities designated
for suspension include the aforementioned
5Mw-capacity graphite-moderated reactors,
the 50Mw and 200Mw-capacity reactors
in Taechon (under construction), reprocessing
facilities, and nuclear-fuel factories. |
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| Q. |
KEDO (Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization) |
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| A. |
KEDO is an international
consortium established on March 10,
1995 with the aim of constructing two
light-water reactors to be provided
by the U.S. in exchange for the suspension
of the two North Korea graphite-moderated
reactors, in accordance with the terms
of the Geneva Agreement. Its headquarters
are located in New York City, and member
nations include South Korea, the U.S.,
Japan, the U.K., Australia, Canada,
Brunei, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Belgium,
the Philippines, Thailand, Italy, Malaysia,
Singapore, New Zealand, and Germany.
It consists of the General Board, the
Executive Board (which includes ROK,
U.S., and Japanese representatives;
votes are unanimous), and the Secretariat
(each Deputy Executive Director is of
U.S., Korean, and Japanese nationality,
respectively). U.S. corporations also
participate to lend technical and legal
consultation for the light-water reactors.
Although the basic objective of KEDO
is to provide North Korea with light-water
reactors, it is also in charge of providing
alternate energy sources (crude oil),
processing nuclear fuel rods, and disassembling
current North Korea nuclear facilities.
KEDO is to disband once the light-water
reactors have been provided. Construction
of the light-water reactor site at Shinpo,
South Hamgyung Province started on the
19th of August, 1997. KEPCO (Korea Electric
Power Co.) was contracted to carry out
the construction, playing a central
role in building the reactors. However,
the 2nd North Korea nuclear crisis has
halted all construction. |
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| Q. |
The Second North Korea Nuclear
Crisis |
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| A. |
The 2nd North Korea nuclear
crisis refers to the course of events
directly following the admittance by
North Korea of its secret nuclear weapons
development program and the concurrent
nullification of the Geneva Agreement,
bringing North Korea nuclear weapons issue
back to its starting-point. North Korea
had long been suspected of pursuing
a secret nuclear program. On-site inspections
held by the U.S. at Kumchangri, where
secret underground nuclear facilities
were believed to be located, suggested
that the truth was in fact otherwise.
However, the visit to Pyongyang by U.S.
Assistant Sec. of State James Kelly
in 2002 led to North Korea’s supposed private
admittance to its secret nuclear program.
North Korea’s nuclear program again became
a major issue in the international community.
The crisis became full-blown after several
relation-eroding measures, including
KEDO’s suspension of crude oil transfers
and North Korea’s extraction of nuclear
fuel rods, led to North Korea’s announcement
of its withdrawal from the NPT (January
10th, 2003). Six-party talks (ROK, North Korea,
U.S., Japan, China, and Russia) were
presented as a framework to overcome
the crisis, and the first round of the
talks was held between the 27th and
the 29th of August, 2003 in Beijing.
The six-party talks have been continuing
intermittently ever since.
 Chronology
| 2002. 10. 3 ~ 5 |
North Korea supposedly
admits in private to the U.S.
to its HEU (highly-enriched uranium)
program |
| 2002. 11.14 |
KEDO announces halt of crude
oil transfers to North Korea |
| 2002. 1 ~ 2. 21 |
North Korea prepares to resume
operation of nuclear facilities
(seals removed from nuclear reactors,
nuclear fuel factories, and radiochemistry
laboratories) |
| 2003. 1. 10 |
North Korea announces withdrawal
from NPT |
| 2003. 8. 27 ~ 29 |
1st Round of six-party talks |
| 2003. 10. 2 |
North Korea announces that 8,000
nuclear fuel rods had been reprocessed |
| 2004. 2. 25 ~ 28 |
2nd Round of six-party talks |
| 2004. 6. 23 ~ 26 |
3rd Round of six-party talks |
| 2005. 2. 10 |
North Korea announces its possession
of nuclear weapons and indefinite
withdrawal from the six-party
talks (announced by North Korea
Foreign Ministry) |
| 2005. 7. 26 ~ 29 |
4th Round of six-party talks |
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| Q. |
Six-Party Talks |
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| A. |
The six-party talks are
a multilateral framework of negotiations,
aimed at defusing the 2nd North Korea
nuclear crisis. This setup contrasts
with the bilateral U.S.-NK talks that
had concluded the 1st North Korea nuclear
crisis. In the second crisis, North
Korea insisted on bilateral talks; but
the U.S. was reluctant to engage in
direct negotiations with North Korea,
citing the lack of credibility caused
by North Korea’s secret pursuit of its
nuclear program even after the announcement
of the Geneva Agreement. Therefore,
a multilateral setup was devised as
an alternative. While it is a positive
factor for the U.S., North Korea and
four other nations to work together
to overcome North Korea’s credibility
problem, the six-party talks have been
criticized for inability to produce
concrete results through intensive negotiations.
Deputy minister-level officials of each
nation are appointed as delegation chiefs,
while delegation vice-chiefs (director-level)
work to draw up specific proposals through
working-level meetings. |
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Issue
