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Outline |
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Time
and Place |
Aug.
27~29, 2003 (Beijing, China) |
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| Representatives |
Lee Soo-hyuk
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Trade |
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Kim Young-il
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs |
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James Kelly
Assistant State Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs |
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Wang Yi
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs |
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Yabunaka Mitoji
Director-General of Asian and Oceanian
Affairs Bureau |
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Alexander Losyukov
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs |
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Outcomes |
| Failing to arrive at a statement of agreement,
a 'Chairman's Summary' for a next round of talks
was drawn up instead. |
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Key Issues |
U.S. - stresses that North
Korea give up its program first / expresses reluctance
on U.S.-NK bilateral talks
 Political/economic
concessions unnegotiable until North Korea's complete,
verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID)
of its nuclear program
Rejection
of a bilateral U.S.-NK framework for approaching
the crisis, bilateral talks for normalization of
relations out of the question until North Korea's
prior CVID of its program (non-aggression treaty
deemed inadequate)
NK - stresses 'simultaneous
action'
North Korea claims that despite its principles of
denuclearization, 'hostile U.S. policy toward North
Korea' is forcing its pursuit of nuclear capability
for self-defense.
U.S.
withdrawal of hostile policies is essential to resolving
the crisis
 North
Korea requests: U.S.-NK non-aggression treaty /
normalization of U.S.-NK relations / lifting of
economic sanctions
All
measures to resolve crisis must take the form of
'simultaneous action' |
|
 4-Stage
Process Proposed by North Korea ('summary agreement'
& 'simultaneous action') |
| North
Korea (freezes program) |
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Announces abandonment
of nuclear program ['words for words'] Pledges
concessions for abandonment of program |
Freezes nuclear materials and facilities
Accepts inspection and supervision |
Declassifies North Korea as terror-sponsoring
state
Lifts sanctions and economic embargo
Expands humanitarian aid (food)
Provides energy (some 2 million kw) |
Resolution of missile issue
(Freezes test-launches, halts exports) |
Normalization of U.S.-NK and Japan-NK relations |
| Dismantles nucelar facilities |
Completes construction of light-water reactors |
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China - deems North Korea
proposal 'reasonable' / proposes U.S.-NK bilateral
talks
Requests
made by North Korea (non-aggression treaty, normalization
of U.S.-NK relations, and establishment of trade
with other states) are justified and reasonable
/ non-aggression treaty should be approached through
bilateral framework
Denuclearization
of the Peninsula and ensuring security of North
Korea regime are issues to be tackled simultaneously
※ During the 1st round of the talks, China was generally
assessed as successfully fulfilling its role as
coordinator / mediator.
South Korea - Presents sequence
of 'simultaneous actions'
Expresses
willingness to faithfully abide by the '6.15 Joint
Declaration' and to continue providing humanitarian
aid
Presents
a sequence of 'simultaneous actions', under the
principle that the nuclear issue calls for comprehensive
efforts |
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Ex-post Assessments |
U.S.-NK - reconfirms incompatibility
of views
The
1st round of the talks served only to highlight
the differences in opinion between the U.S. and
North Korea, ending with an agreement to hold another
round of talks.
North Korea - questions
usefulness of the six-party talks
On
August 30 (two days after the 1st round of talks
had come to an end), the spokesman of North Korea
Foreign Ministry comments at a Korean Central Broadcasting
press conference that the "six-party talks
were mere armchair discussions of no value whatsoever.
We have discarded all hope or interest in the talks."
He adds, "We have reconfirmed that we have
no other choice but to continue fortifying our nuclear
capabilities for the purpose of self-defense."
U.S. - increasing dominance
of hard-line views
While
the White House and the State Department deem
the talks a success, domestic hard-line the outcome
of the talks.
U.S.
media, citing the August 30 announcement by North
Korea, stress the need for a hard-line response
rather than analyzing and revising the proceedings
of the talks.
Caught
between two extremes, the Bush administration
fails to provide a clear guideline on North Korea-related
policies. It becomes known that Kelly, who had
led the U.S. delegation, was forced by hard-liners
to participate in the talks with no discretionary
authority.
China - urges the U.S.
to broaden considerations
While
China deems North Korea's surprise announcement
'negotiable', it criticizes the U.S. for its lack
of clarity in its North Korea-related policy.
On
September 1, Chinese representative Wang Yi remarks
that "the single greatest obstacle to resolving
the crisis is Washington's North Korea-related
policy," and urges the U.S. to consider different
options and measures to negotiate with North Korea.
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