Outline |
|
Time
and Place |
Jun. 23~25, 2004 (Beijing, China) |
|
| Representatives |
Lee Soo-hyuk
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Trade |
| |
Kim Gye-gwan
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| |
James Kelly
Assistant State Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs |
| |
Wang Yi
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| |
Yabunaka Mitoji
Director-General of Asian and Oceanian
Affairs Bureau |
| |
Alexander Alexeyev
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs |
|
|
 |
|
|
|
Outcomes |
 Failure
to announce a Joint Declaration / agreement on a
Chairman's Statement of eight articles
- Chairman's Statement - reconfirmation of determination
for the denuclearization of the Peninsula, stresses
the prompt specification of the scope/time, interval/method
of verification for the CVID process as a first
step in resolving the crisis / emphasizes gradual
progress under 'words for words' and 'actions
for actions'
- Agreement to hold 4th round of talks in Beijing
before September 2004 |
|
|
|
|
Key Issues |
U.S. - presents working-level
plan for the first time
- The U.S. presents a working-level plan, similar
to South Korea '3-stage process', for the first
time at the 3rd round of the talks
- The plan accepts some North Korea requests,
such as providing energy and ensuring regime security
in exchange for North Korea actions to freeze
nuclear program |
|
 Summary
of the U.S. Proposa |
|
| Concessions
(implemented gradually) |
|
| Announcement on abandoning
nuclear program (including HEU) / enacting
preparatory measures to dismantle nuclear
facilities ( within 3 months ) |
ⅰ) Consent for
South Korea/China/Japan/Russia to provide
North Korea with crude oil
ⅱ) Multilateral security assurance, including
non-aggression treaty
ⅲ) Provision of non-nuclear energy
ⅳ) Discussion of U.S. declassification of
North Korea as state sponsor of terrorism |
| Complete denuclearization |
Pursuit of normalization
of U.S.-NK relations |
|
|
North Korea - modifies
position on freezing program and CVID
North Korea expresses willingness to freeze all
facilities and reprocessed materials concerned with
nuclear weapons - and also possibly nuclear use
altogether - so long as certain conditions are met.
North Korea also states that the freeze would include
a pledge to halt further production, transfer, or
testing of nuclear weapons.
※ North Korea also announces that it is willing
to include its facilities in Yongbyon in the proposed
freeze. |
|
|
|
|
Assessments |
Six-party framework retained
/ U.S. and NK present working-level plans
Both
the U.S. and North Korea present specific working-level
plans as basis for future negotiations.
Continued U.S.-NK distrust
and emphasis on 'the other's action first'
Much
progress is achieved during the 3rd round of the
talks through the revised and detailed working-level
plans proposed by both the U.S. and North Korea.
North Korea even comments that the U.S. proposal
was 'constructive'.
However,
the mutual distrust between the two parties proves
to be deep-rooted; both express reluctance to take
action until the other takes verifiable action first.
Both
parties fail to bridge fundamental differences in
opinions concerning the scope of CVID, peaceful
use of nuclear technology, and the existence/method
of verification of HEU. |
|
| Developments
Until the 4th Round |
The
window of opportunity provided by the outcomes
of the 3rd round is squandered due to deteriorating
U.S.-NK relations stemming from pressure from
U.S. hard-liners (who pushed for a Lybian
model of disarmament) and the U.S. Congress'
passing of North Korea Human Rights Act. The
4th round of talks fail to convene before
the September 2004 deadline.
Dashing
the hopes of North Korea leadership, President
George W. Bush is re-elected to a second term
in November 2004. North Korea takes a 'wait-and-see'
stance.
Various
negative events occur during the organization
of the Bush administration's North Korea policy-related
staff, headed by Condoleezza Rice and Christopher
Hill: tensions following U.S. officials' use
of the term, 'outpost of tyranny' in reference
to North Korea; North Korea's Feb. 10 announcement
on its possession of nuclear weapons; the
DRPK proposal to transform the talks into
a regional arms-reduction negotiation, etc.
With
the talks being suspended for more than a
year since the last (3rd) round, participant
states begin to question the usefulness of
the talks by June 2005. The six-party talks
are in danger of losing momentum
Agreement
to hold a 4th round of talks comes after a
series of events including: South Korea-U.S.
summit talks; a softer U.S. attitude toward
North Korea; U.S. Secretary of State Rice's
remark acknowledging North Korea sovereignty;
resumption of U.S.-NK contact through the
New York channel; South Korea Unification
Minister Chung Dong-young's talks with Kim
Jong-il; unofficial contact between U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Hill and North Korea Vice
Foreign Minister Kim; suggestion of the possibility
of bilateral U.S.-NK talks within the six-party
framework; and South Korea government's announcement
of its own 'important proposal'. |
|
