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Outline |
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Time
and Place |
December
18 ~ 22, 2006 in Beijing, China |
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| Representatives |
Chun Yung-woo
Special Representative for Korean Peninsula
Peace and Security Affairs |
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Kim Kye-kwan
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs |
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Christopher Hill
Assistant State Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs |
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Wu Dawei
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs |
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Kenichiro Sasae
Director-General of Asian and Oceanian
Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs |
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Sergei Razov
Ambassador to China |
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Outcomes |
| Overall, the Parties neither achieved notable
progress nor agreed on the dates for the next round
despite a bilateral working-level meeting between
North Korea and the United States on frozen North
Korean accounts at Macao's Banco Delta Asia as requested
by Pyongyang. |
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| Summary of Chairman’s Statement
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1. The Parties
reaffirmed their will to achieve peaceful
denuclearization.
2. The Parties reaffirmed their commitment
to carrying out the Joint Statement of September
19, 2005 and agreed to take “coordinated
steps.”
3. The parties held useful discussions on
so-called "starting phase actions"
to be taken.
4. The Parties agreed to reconvene at the
earliest opportunity. |
| <Full
Text of Chairman’s Statement> |
The Second Session
of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks
was held in Beijing from December 18 to 22,
2006.
The Parties reviewed changes and developments
in the situation of the Six-Party Talks and
reaffirmed their common goal and will to achieve
the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula through dialogue. They reiterated
that they would earnestly carry out their
commitments in the Joint Statement of 19 September
2005, and agreed to take coordinated steps
to implement the Joint Statement as soon as
possible in a phased manner in line with the
principle of "action for action."
The Parties held useful discussions on measures
to implement the Joint Statement and on actions
to be taken by the Parties in the starting
phase and put forward some initial ideas.
The Parties, through intensive bilateral consultations,
had candid and in-depth exchange of views
to address their concerns.
The Parties agreed to recess to report to
capitals and to reconvene at the earliest
opportunity. |
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Course of the Talks
Since the talks resumed for the first time after
North Korea took the “aggravating measures” of test-firing
missiles and conducting a nuclear test, much attention
was focused on whether the parties would be able
to produce a breakthrough. However, North Korea
and the United States drew a line on the BDA issue
as the North stuck to the issue while the U.S. considered
it separate from the talks. The parties did not
make much progress other than exchanging fundamental
“initial ideas.” Meanwhile, a separate working-level
meeting on the BDA issue between Pyongyang and Washington
raised hopes but did not yield progress. |
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Course of the Talks
 North
Korea
said it could only discuss the nuclear issue after
resolving the matter of its frozen assets at the
Macao-based bank, Banco Delta Asia.
The
United States
proposed an “early harvest” that would allow the
North to receive various incentives in return for
taking initial steps to prove its intention to denuclearize.
According to the U.S. proposal, the next step measures
would be discussed while the North takes the initial
steps. Washington made the proposal at a trilateral
meeting with Pyongyang and Beijing at the end of
November, but the North did not immediately respond.
South
Korea
suggested a “package deal,” which reflected its
efforts to mediate between the United States and
North Korea. The deal, albeit similar to the U.S.
“early harvest” proposal, was a deviation from the
principle of “action for action” as it urged the
parties to discuss disarmament steps and corresponding
measures in packages in accordance with a general
road map. |
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Main Issues |
BDA
The United States froze about 24-million dollars
in fifty North Korean accounts at Macao's Banco
Delta Asia, alleging that the accounts were used
for counterfeiting and money-laundering. North Korea
protested the freeze, calling it a financial sanction,
and linked resolution of the issue with progress
in the multilateral disarmament talks while the
United States maintained that it was a legal matter
outside the scope of the six-party talks. Thus,
it gave the North a cause to refuse the six-party
talks for 13 months and perform its first-ever nuclear
test. The issue held back the recent session as
Pyongyang focused on the BDA issue while the United
States stuck to its previous stance. The parties
were not able to raise any other issues.
Working-Level
Meeting on BDA
As North Korea demanded resolution of the BDA issue
as a precondition for resuming the six-party talks,
North Korean and U.S. top working-level officials
met in Beijing on December 19-20 in parallel with
the six-party talks.
At the meeting, the president of North Korea's Foreign
Trade Bank O Kwang-chol and the U.S. Treasury's
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing
and Financial Crimes Daniel Glaser represented their
respective countries. The U.S. side outlined legal
procedures in the U.S. Treasury Department’s probe
into the Macao bank and disclosed some of its investigation
results as the North viewed positively the U.S.
attitude. However, Pyongyang reiterated its view
that the U.S. freeze was a financial sanction, an
example of hostile U.S. policy against the communist
state. Washington, for its part, stressed that the
freeze was in accordance with U.S. law and was not
subject to political negotiation. At the same time,
it is said that the U.S. financial representatives
did not present evidence for the alleged illegitimacy
of North Korean funds at Banco Delta Asia. In the
end, while the December bilateral meeting proved
fruitless, a shred of hope remained in the fact
that the two sides agreed to resume talks in January
2007 in New York.
“Starting
Phase Actions”
The United States proposed at its trilateral meeting
with North Korea and China in November several initial
phase measures that would confirm North Korea’s
intention to give up its nuclear program. The resolution
of the North Korean nuclear issue would begin with
North Korea's announcement that it would give up
its nuclear program, followed by steps that it would
take to carry out the announcement. In response,
the other parties would take the so-called “corresponding
measures” to provide incentives for Pyongyang.
The United States proposed starting phase measures
without dividing them into stages in an effort to
facilitate the negotiations. The starting phase
actions included clauses requiring North Korea to
stop operating its experimental nuclear reactor
in Yongbyon, to accept the resumption of International
Atomic Energy Agency inspections of its nuclear
facilities, to report its nuclear facilities and
materials and to close down its nuclear test sites.
In turn, the United States would unfreeze the North’s
legitimate accounts and provide various forms of
economic assistance. In particular, before the recent
six-party talks, Washington mentioned it was willing
to give a written security guarantee. |
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Assessment |
Changes
in N. Korean Tactics
In the recent six-party talks, North Korea changed
its negotiation tactics, separating its nuclear
weapons from its nuclear program in order to catch
a bigger fish. The U.S. “early harvest” proposal
and South Korea’s “package deal” were to respond
to such changes.
N.
Korea’s Persistence on the BDA Issue
North Korea stuck to the BDA issue, blocking the
overall progress of the talks. It showed inconsistency
on suggesting a nuclear freeze or dismantlement
measures. After hinting that it could not give up
its nuclear weapons, the North Korean side said
it could carry out nuclear disarmament measures
if the BDA issue is resolved and other conditions
were met. Hence, the United States offered its deal.
But the North did not respond except to reiterate
its stance on the BDA issue. As a result, the talks
stalled.
Mistrust
Between the U.S. and N. Korea
From the outside, the talks appeared ineffective
because of the North’s clinging to the BDA issue.
However, a more fundamental problem was the mutual
lack of trust between the United States and North
Korea. Because of such mistrust, Washington asked
Pyongyang for proof of its intention to disarm its
nuclear program, while Pyongyang continued to press
for resolution of the BDA issue as a precondition.
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Each Party's Gains and Losses |
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| South Korea
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took
on a role as mediator as well as one of the
main parties concerned in the North Korean
nuclear issue by proposing its “package deal.”
However, the proposal's failure to bear fruit
displayed its limits as a mediator and further
complicated inter-Korean relations. |
| North Korea |
succeeded
in holding a bilateral meeting with the United
States and in raising such issues as the freeze
on its Macao accounts. But because it clung
to the BDA issue, Pyongyang failed to secure
practical gains (while dimming prospects for
Chinese and South Korean economic assistance). |
| The United
States |
was
able to clearly identify where North Korea
stood, but lack of progress pushed it to the
limits of its patience. Later, it may strengthen
sanctions against the North. |
| China |
was
able to fortify its diplomatic position on
the international stage thanks to its brokering
of the talks' resumption, but its influence
on North Korea was questioned after it failed
to persuade Pyongyang further. |
| Japan |
did
not make significant gains. It failed to raise
the Japanese abductee issue and to hold bilateral
talks with the North. This may result in further
deterioration of Pyongyang-Tokyo relations.
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| Russia |
served
as a quiet mediator between the United States
and North Korea. However, its failure to contribute
to notable results might curb its influence
in Northeast Asia. |
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Prospects |
To
Reconvene at the “Earliest Opportunity”
The Chairman’s Statement said that the talks would
reconvene at the “earliest opportunity," language
more vague than the wording “at the earliest possible
date” used in the previous statement following the
first session of the fifth round of the six-party
talks. Simply put, the second session was worse
than the first one. Thus, some declared the multilateral
framework useless and others predicted that the
next round was unlikely to take place any time soon.
Working-Level
Meeting on BDA
The recent talks displayed that, without overcoming
the BDA issue due to Pyongyang’s stubbornness, the
six-party talks could not expect to make any progress.
Therefore, the bilateral working-level meeting between
the United States and North Korea, slated for January
2007, holds the key to the next round of talks.
However, recent reports suggesting that Pyongyang
wanted to change the meeting location from New York
to Beijing or another city cast doubts on prospects
for the working-level discussions. |
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Recess |
| As the six-party talks are officially
in recess, the parties will actively seek their
resumption. However, most believe the talks are
unlikely to resume any earlier than February 2007.
As voices dismissing the talks as useless are on
the rise, hardliners will gain momentum. This will
put the concerned parties who called for dialogue,
especially North Korea, in an unfavorable position.
If the parties succeed in harnessing a driving force
for the talks, they may yet be able to achieve a
breakthrough. |
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