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Outline |
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Time
and Place |
February
8~13, 2007 in Beijing, China |
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| Representatives |
Chun Yung-woo
Special Representative for Korean Peninsula
Peace and Security Affairs |
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Kim Kye-kwan
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs |
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Christopher Hill
Assistant State Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs |
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Wu Dawei
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs |
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Kenichiro Sasae
Director-General of Asian and Oceanian
Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs |
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Alexander Losyukov
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Russian Federation |
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Results |
| The parties adopted a denuclearization agreement
stipulating that North Korea will take initial actions
with the eventual goal of dismantling its nuclear
facilities; in turn, the other five parties will
take corresponding measures. |
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The parties agreed that |
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North Korea will
· Shut down and seal its Yongbyon nuclear facility
and invite the return of inspectors from the
International Atomic Energy Agency;
· Discuss with the other parties a list of all its
nuclear programs;
· Declare all nuclear programs; and
· Disable all existing nuclear facilities.
In return,
· North Korea and the United States will start bilateral
talks aimed at normalization.
Washington will begin the process of removing
Pyongyang from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
It will advance the process of terminating
application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with
respect
to the North.
· North Korea and Japan will begin bilateral talks
to normalize ties.
· The five parties will cooperate in economic, energy
and humanitarian assistance to the North.
· The five parties will provide the initial shipment
of emergency energy assistance equivalent
to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) to
North Korea. And,
· If North Korea completes disabling all nuclear
facilities, the parties will give an additional
950-thousand tons of HFO.
Parties agreed to establish five Working Groups for
· Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
· Normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations
· Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations
· Economic and Energy Cooperation
· Northeast Asian Peace and Security Mechanism
(The Parties agreed that all Working Groups
will meet within the next 30 days.)
Parties also agreed
· To promptly hold a ministerial meeting to confirm
implementation of the Joint Statement of
September 19, 2005 and to seek ways to promote
security cooperation in Northeast Asia.
· To negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum. |
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| <Initial
Actions for the Implementation of the Joint
Statement > |
| ㆍAgreement Download |
The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the
Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among
the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic
of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United
States of America from 8 to 13 February 2007.
Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro
Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan;
Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative
for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs
of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade; Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation;
and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
Department of State of the United States attended
the talks as heads of their respective delegations.
Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the
talks.
I. The Parties held serious and productive
discussions on the actions each party will
take in the initial phase for the implementation
of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005.
The Parties reaffirmed their common goal and
will to achieve early denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner
and reiterated that they would earnestly fulfill
their commitments in the Joint Statement.
The Parties agreed to take coordinated steps
to implement the Joint Statement in a phased
manner in line with the principle of “action
for action”.
II. The Parties agreed to take the following
actions in parallel in the initial phase:
1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the
purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon
nuclear facility, including the reprocessing
facility and invite back IAEA personnel to
conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications
as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.
2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties
a list of all its nuclear programs as described
in the Joint Statement, including plutonium
extracted from used fuel rods, that would
be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement.
3. The DPRK and the US will start bilateral
talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral
issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations.
The US will begin the process of removing
the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor
of terrorism and advance the process of terminating
the application of the Trading with the Enemy
Act with respect to the DPRK.
4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral
talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their
relations in accordance with the Pyongyang
Declaration, on the basis of the settlement
of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues
of concern.
5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint
Statement of 19 September 2005, the Parties
agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and
humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In this
regard, the Parties agreed to the provision
of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK
in the initial phase. The initial shipment
of emergency energy assistance equivalent
to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will
commence within next 60 days.
The Parties agreed that the above-mentioned
initial actions will be implemented within
next 60 days and that they will take coordinated
steps toward this goal.
III. The Parties agreed on the establishment
of the following Working Groups (WG) in order
to carry out the initial actions and for the
purpose of full implementation of the Joint
Statement:
1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
2. Normalization of DPRK-US relations
3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations
4. Economy and Energy Cooperation
5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism
The WGs will discuss and formulate specific
plans for the implementation of the Joint
Statement in their respective areas. The WGs
shall report to the Six-Party Heads of Delegation
Meeting on the progress of their work. In
principle, progress in one WG shall not affect
progress in other WGs. Plans made by the five
WGs will be implemented as a whole in a coordinated
manner.
The Parties agreed that all WGs will meet
within next 30 days.
IV. During the period of the Initial Actions
phase and the next phase ? which includes
provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration
of all nuclear programs and disablement of
all existing nuclear facilities, including
graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing
plant ? economic, energy and humanitarian
assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million
tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the
initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons
of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.
The detailed modalities of the said assistance
will be determined through consultations and
appropriate assessments in the Working Group
on Economic and Energy Cooperation.
V. Once the initial actions are implemented,
the Six Parties will promptly hold a ministerial
meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint
Statement and explore ways and means for promoting
security cooperation in Northeast Asia.
VI. The Parties reaffirmed that they will
take positive steps to increase mutual trust,
and will make joint efforts for lasting peace
and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly
related parties will negotiate a permanent
peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an
appropriate separate forum.
VII. The Parties agreed to hold the Sixth
Round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007
to hear reports of WGs and discuss on actions
for the next phase. |
| Agreed
Minute on Burden Sharing |
| The United Sates,
China, Russia and the ROK, subject to their
respective national governments’ decisions,
agreed to share the burden of assistance to
the DPRK referred to in Paragraph II (5) and
IV on the basis of the principle of equality
and equity; look forward to the participation
of Japan on the basis of the same principle
as its concerns are addressed; and welcome
the participation of the international community
in this process. |
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Course of the Talks |
 “Good
Start”
The third session seemed to start off well amid
hopes for smooth progress as North Korea and the
United States had narrowed their differences substantially
during talks between their top negotiators in Berlin.
Since China circulated its draft agreement among
the concerned parties as the third session began,
some speculated that an agreement could be had perhaps
with as little as the fixing up of a few lines.
Energy
Deadlock
However, at the end of the second day of talks,
negotiations over the provision of energy aid to
North Korea hit a deadlock. North Korea and the
other five parties sharply differed on the amount
of heavy fuel oil the North should receive. The
six delegations worked to narrow the gap, with Pyongyang
lowering its demand while the other parties raised
their offer. Views on the outlook for the talks
differed widely.
Last-Minute
Agreement
On February 12, top negotiators traded figures in
bilateral meetings held on the sidelines of the
main session. In particular, Pyongyang and Tokyo
held their first head-to-head meeting of the third
session. The United States and North Korea continued
their third bilateral meeting past midnight, reaching
agreement around three o'clock in the morning. |
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Key Issues |
Heavy
Fuel Oil
The parties varied widely on the energy aid issue,
with offers/demands ranging from 500-thousand to
two million tons of heavy fuel oil. Whereas the
North had focused on unfreezing its accounts at
Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in the previous session,
it pursued the energy issue during the third session
for the following reasons: First, Pyongyang began
to see progress on the BDA issue in separate bilateral
talks with Washington. Second, it was grappling
with a serious energy shortage at home. And third,
after conducting a nuclear test, it believed it
could cash in on a much better negotiating position.
Pyongyang used its traditional negotiation strategy
of declaring a high price in the beginning and working
down to meet the other’s offer.
Initial
Actions
The third session began with the concept of “initial
actions” which was established during the previous
session and elaborated at the Berlin talks. Therefore,
although the concept should have been the focal
point, the corresponding measures, particularly
the energy aid, stole the center of attention as
the parties reached consensus on what the initial
actions would be. The new agreement differed from
the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework in that it adopted
a phased reward system instead of simply swapping
a nuclear freeze for energy aid. It also added higher-level
denuclearization steps: North Korea's shutting down,
disabling and dismantlement of its nuclear facilities
and the other five parties’ corresponding measures.
Denuclearization
Steps
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This
means switching off and sealing nuclear facilities.
North Korea can reactivate facilities by simply
breaking the seals and switching facilities
back on. It will take five to six years to
complete dismantlement from this step. |
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This
is a step beyond freezing.Maintenance and
repairs of sealed facilities are banned.Reactivation
will require substantial time and effort.
Only a few months short of complete dismantlement. |
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This
means a permanent shutdown of nuclear facilities
including taking technical measures to remove
the key reactor component—the nuclear core.
Reactivation will require facility reconstruction.
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This
is the ultimate goal. However, it's a different
story if North Korea considers its nuclear
facility separate from the nuclear weapons
program. |
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Shouldering Energy Aid to North Korea |
How to share the cost of funding the energy aid
became a key issue which could encroach on the progress
thus far. The United States and Japan kept quiet
on the issue hoping South Korea would take the lead.
However, Seoul held fast to the principle of equal
distribution among the five parties in providing
heavy fuel oil (HFO) to Pyongyang.
Each Party’s Position on
HFO
· The United States kept quiet
· China worked actively to resolve the matter.
· Japan was unwilling to contribute, unless the
issue of North Korea's past abductions of Japanese
nationals was resolved.
· Russia was reluctant to contribute, citing a domestic
law that prohibited giving aid to the indebted
North Korea.
· South Korea adhered to the principle of equal
distribution. |
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Assessment |
First-Ever
Specific Measures
The biggest achievement in the third session is
that the parties were able to adopt an agreement
with specific measures for the first time since
the North Korean nuclear problem resurfaced. Whereas
the previous rounds of the six-party talks had revolved
around principles, the new agreement spells out
the initial actions toward ultimate dismantlement
of North Korea’s nuclear program. Of course, the
burden remains in the fact that, as the parties
take each step, they have to make progress in the
next level of talks. However, it is a meaningful
development that the parties have finally set sail
toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Multi-Track
Approach
Establishing five Working Groups to resolve related
issues will be a useful tool to move forward. According
to the agreement, progress in one Working Group
shall not affect progress in other Working Groups.
Therefore, each issue will be dealt with separately.
In other words, a deadlock on one issue will not
hinder discussions of the other ones. The agreement
added that “Plans made by the five Working Groups
will be implemented as a whole in a coordinated
manner” in order to accelerate the implementation
process.
Political
Considerations
The new agreement provided for high-level involvement
by requiring a ministerial meeting. This will engage
the political will of the parties to implement the
agreement. The new accord also created a stepping
stone for the six-party talks to become a venue
not only to address the North Korean nuclear issue
but other Northeast Asia-related issues as well.
Separate
Forum on Permanent Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula
The new agreement has provided for a forum to discuss
a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,
which by itself may be a complicated issue. The
forum may discuss an official end to the Korean
War as suggested by U.S. President George W. Bush.
It will be more effective to discuss the peace regime
along with progress made toward resolving the North
Korean nuclear issue. |
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Prospects and Goals |
Implementation
of the Agreement
In negotiating with North Korea, the actual implementation
of agreed measures has always been a concern. The
new agreement will mean nothing if Pyongyang does
not take the initial actions it has pledged to undertake.
This time, however, the possibility of carrying
out the agreement is greater because the initial
actions and corresponding measures are knit closely
together. Nonetheless, it is difficult to forecast
what would happen at the working-level stage—a practical
and determining stage.
Difficulties
in Negotiating on Divided Steps
North Korea took a strategy of dividing denuclearization
into many steps. By breaking the process into as
many steps as possible, it aims to maximize benefits
from corresponding measures where the other five
parties can easily have differing opinions. Therefore,
the most important task in subsequent negotiations
is to synchronize the denuclearization steps of
North Korea and corresponding actions of the other
five parties.
Separating
Nuclear Facilities and Weapons Program
Similar to its strategy of dividing the denuclearization
process into many steps, North Korea may insist
on separating its nuclear weapons program from the
rest of its nuclear facilities. Pyongyang has developed
nuclear weapons despite many difficulties; if it
already has nuclear weapons, it is not likely to
give them up. Therefore, the North may attempt to
negotiate separately on its nuclear facilities and
nuclear weapons program. Giving up its nuclear weapons
will be the very last denuclearization step for
North Korea, which in turn will demand much greater
rewards than it will receive from dismantling its
nuclear facilities.
Long
Way to Go
Achieving the ultimate goal of a nuclear-free Korean
Peninsula is an extremely difficult task. For instance,
just taking a step forward from shutting down to
disabling North Korea's nuclear facilities will
not be easy. Furthermore, the dismantlement steps
and nuclear weapons issue remain to be resolved.
At each step, North Korea will push and pull to
maximize its gain. Also, there may be unexpected
variables such as internal changes in North Korea
and other factors that could come into play such
as the BDA issue. In addition, fierce competition
among the parties for leadership of the Northeast
Asian region may arise as another variable.
Inter-Korean
Relations
The new agreement has cleared a hurdle in inter-Korean
relations. South Korea will be able to resume food
and fertilizer aid to the North and reopen inter-Korean
dialogue channels. Such developments may lead to
Seoul-Pyongyang summit talks after the North Korean
nuclear issue is resolved. Domestically, with the
approach of the presidential election, inter-Korean
relations may become a very sensitive issue.
North
Korea’s Normalization of Ties with the United States
and with Japan
The new agreement provided for ways to improve U.S.-North
Korea relations. It called for the removal of North
Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism
and the unfreezing of the North's foreign accounts.
It also opened the door to what Pyongyang badly
wanted - direct contacts with Washington - which
could lead to improved bilateral ties as North Korea
carries out the initial actions and builds trust
with the U.S.
In North Korea-Japan ties, the abductee issue remains
a hurdle. Nevertheless, since the North will gain
much from energy aid, it should be able to soften
its position on the matter. The new agreement opened
a possibility for the two sides to discuss the abductee
issue head on.
Next
Talks on March 19
The next talks slated for March 19 will provide
an opportunity to review progress in the month since
the agreement. New stumbling blocks, if any, will
surface before the talks. Therefore, merely opening
the talks on time will mean passing the first hurdle.
Shortcomings
of the February 13 Agreement
The agreement stated that the five megawatt nuclear
reactor in Yongbyon was to be disabled but makes
no mention of the unfinished 200 megawatt reactor
in Taecheon. Also, its clause calling for North
Korea to “discuss with other parties a list of all
its nuclear programs…including plutonium” is ambiguous
at best. Moreover, the agreement failed to mention
another key issue: Pyongyang’s possession of highly-enriched
uranium (HEU). These issues may surface as hindrances
to the denuclearization process at any time. |
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