• Announcement of a 'Chairman's Statement' of seven articles, the first 'letter of agreement' produced by the six-party talks

- Chairman's Statement - Agreement on 'Denuclearization of the Peninsula' and 'Peaceful Coexistence of Participating States' / stresses the use of 'mutually coordinated measures' to resolve the crisis

- Agreement to retain the momentum of the talks by holding the 3rd round of talks with full participation during the second quarter of 2004 / agreement to organize a working group meeting to prepare for the 3rd round of talks

• As in the 1st round, North Korea continues to claim that any agreement or pledge by the U.S. would be meaningless unless it abandons its 'hostile policies'.
  - Requests 'U.S.-NK non-aggression treaty', 'acknowledgement of North Korea sovereignty', 'normalization of U.S.-DRPK relations', and 'lifting of economic sanctions' as evidence that the U.S. has abandoned hostile policies
• DRPK focus on: 1) ascertaining U.S. willingness to back up its non-aggression intentions and ensure the DRPK regime's security in the form of official documents and 2) confirming the specific concessions the U.S. would be prepared to make upon North Korea's pledge to abandon its nuclear program.
• Some analysts interpret these principles as a conciliatory gesture by North Korea in that it expressed 'an actual willingness' to give up its program.

• The U.S. responds affirmatively to North Korea request concerning regime security, raising the possibility of a future working group meeting to discuss that end.
• However, it also expands the previous CVID objectives to include not only the plutonium-based nuclear weapons program but also the alleged HEU nuclear weapons program and nuclear materials/ facilities for peaceful use.

• North Korea denies possession of HEU
• North Korea is in a difficult position to abandon the peaceful use of nuclear energy (i.e., power generation) owing to its economic depression and limited capacity to meet electricity demands
• Failure to reach working-level agreements due to continued U.S.-NK disagreement on the scope of CVID objectives

• South Korea proposes a 3-stage process within a cooperative framework between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, which would later form the basis of future six-party talks.
• South Korea also demonstrates initiative by presenting energy-aid plans for North Korea's abandonment of its nuclear program, receiving support from China/Russia and consent from the U.S. and Japan.

• Intensive and concrete negotiations on the requirements and concessions for each stage of the 3-stage process / improved working-level efforts by the U.S. and North Korea (in comparison with the 1st round)
• General agreement to hold 3rd round of talks / agreement to introduce an institutional device (i.e., practical group meetings) to ensure the permanent continuation of the talks

• North Korea replaces the head of its delegation to the 2nd round of talks with a higher-ranking Vice-Minister, Kim Gye-gwan, who participates in the negotiations with an 'anything is negotiable' attitude.

• The U.S. continues to state that all North Korea issues, including its nuclear program, missiles, conventional weapons, biological/ chemical weapons, and human rights violations, must be resolved before any moves to normalize U.S.-NK relations.
  ※ The U.S. repeatedly stresses that the occasions of bilateral U.S.-NK contact during the talks were 'unofficial contacts, not negotiations'.

• During revisions to the final draft of the 2nd round's Statement, North Korea replaces "a closer understanding of the other's position" with "some differences, that may be adjusted later on" in order to clearly stress the unacceptability of key U.S. demands (scope of CVID, etc.).