The six-country nuclear talks kicked off in Beijing on December 8th for a three-day run. The negotiations were extended by one day to December 11th, but the discussions eventually hit an impasse when negotiators couldn’t agree on how to verify North Korea’s nuclear programs. They failed to reach a compromise on the biggest sticking point of the talks--whether or not a verification protocol should be expressly stipulated in the text. After the meeting, South Korean chief nuclear negotiator Kim Sook said during a press conference that he got the impression North Korea was attempting to be as ambiguous as possible regarding the verification issue, while the U.S. was intending to codify the verbal agreement on verification reached between the two sides in October. Their respective interpretations of the agreement proved to be widely different during last week’s talks, resulting in the breakdown of the negotiations. Why did North Korea strongly reject the inclusion of the wording of ‘sample taking’ in the text, even at the risk of the talks’ collapse? Here’s Professor Ryu Gil-jae from the University of North Korean Studies to explain.

It’s hard for North Korea to allow soil samples at its nuclear sites to be taken out of the country for analysis in the current nuclear disablement stage, because the sampling would make it possible to disclose its nuclear development history and its nuclear capabilities. The North claims the sampling should be carried out in the third phase of nuclear dismantlement, that is, the last negotiation stage. North Korea seems to be insisting that inspections be made only on declared nuclear facilities and sampling be dealt with a little later. Kim Kye-gwan and Christopher Hill, nuclear envoys from North Korea and the U.S., met in Pyongyang in early October and arrived at an ambiguous understanding about the nuclear verification protocol. But South Korea and Japan call for a more clear verification and there is some dissent within the U.S. government on this issue. The October deal between the North and the U.S. wasn’t delivered properly during the six-party talks last week, and the Beijing talks eventually broke down.

North Korea has been adamant that verification should come only after the completion of the second denuclearization measures, namely, the nuclear disablement and declaration, the removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and the provision of energy assistance to the North. Pyongyang is worried that it may lose its nuclear card to negotiate with the U.S. if it agrees to sampling, because it could reveal all the North’s past nuclear activities. Ahead of the inauguration of the Obama government in the U.S., North Korea may find it a great burden to codify the nuclear sampling in the verification protocol. So, the last six-party talks under the Bush administration ended without progress on the nuclear issue. In the wake of the failed meeting, the participants have offered conflicting views on whether to continue fuel aid to North Korea.

Fuel aid is also related to nuclear verification. Under the February 13th nuclear agreement reached in 2007, North Korea was to receive 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil, or energy aid of equivalent value from the other five participating nations, in return for its nuclear disablement. More than half of the aid has been delivered to the North already. South Korea and Japan maintain that the remaining amount should be provided after Pyongyang agrees to a nuclear verification protocol. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says the five nations negotiating with North Korea have agreed to halt fuel delivery to the North, but Russia argues that it has never given consent to that. Russia says it will continue oil shipments, even though the recent six-party talks foundered over the verification issue. The negotiators seem to be showing differing views on the fuel provision, and even South Korea and the U.S. slightly differ in opinion.

While the negotiators are voicing different views on the fuel aid, North Korea takes an even stronger stance, threatening to slow the pace of disabling its nuclear facilities if the supply of promised heavy fuel oil is suspended. Regardless of the North’s bluff, the U.S. remains firm in its principle that it won’t provide fuel aid to the North unless Pyongyang agrees to a verification protocol. But regarding the failed Beijing talks, the U.S. doesn’t insist on taking a step to put North Korea back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Washington says the negotiations have simply been postponed and that it will not link the negotiations with re-listing, showing an about-face in its strict diplomatic principle.

Last week’s talks were the last six-party negotiations under the Bush administration. The Obama government will take office on January 20 next year, so officials of the current U.S. government won’t likely have a chance to negotiate with North Korea again. Washington was supposed to remove Pyongyang from the terrorism list in August, but it delayed the measure until October. If the U.S. reverses the decision now, the Bush government will end up making no progress in the nuclear issue through the six-party talks and therefore won’t produce any diplomatic results. Re-listing North Korea on the terrorism list would also mean that the current U.S. government will push the nuclear dispute back to the previous stage and simply pass it on to the incoming government, which is unthinkable for the Bush administration.

Washington seems to be dismissing the possibility of relisting, concluding that the move will have little punitive effect in reality and only cause unnecessary tension. Instead, the Bush administration seeks to sustain what it has achieved in the nuclear disablement process and pass the task of establishing a verification regime on to the Obama government. Meanwhile, controversy is rising over the speculation that the next U.S. administration is carefully reviewing the matter of recognizing North Korea as a modified Pakistani model of a nuclear weapons state. Professor Ryu explains if the U.S. acknowledges North Korea as an unofficial nuclear state, the six-party dialogue frame designed to end the nuclear crisis will inevitably collapse.

If North Korea is recognized as an unofficial nuclear weapons state, just like Pakistan, India and Israel—even if it may not gain the official status specified in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—we can’t ignore the North’s demand for negotiations solely between nuclear powers. Since the U.S. Defense Department named North Korea as a nuclear state in its recent report, this issue may emerge as an unexpected variable. But the Pentagon later said the report did not reflect the official U.S. position, so we’ll have to watch how the situation may evolve. The fate of the six-party talks depends on whether the Obama administration will regard North Korea as a nuclear power or maintain the current ambiguous nuclear status of the North.

With President Bush’s term nearing an end, North Korea will have to negotiate with the Obama government from now on. The future of the six-party talks and that of North Korea will be greatly influenced by how the next U.S. president will use the multilateral negotiations and whether the nuclear issue will be put before any other diplomatic concerns. We do hope involved countries will be able to notch significant progress in the nuclear issue in 2009. 　 [Interview] Researcher of N. Korean Films Seeks Cultural Unity between Two Koreas
This movie, ‘Don’t Wake up Mom,’ was produced by Chosun Central TV in North Korea. It consists of two themes. Revolving around a female scientist, the movie emphasizes the importance of science. Also, it urges husbands in the male-dominated North Korean society to help their wives with household chores, since the female workforce is becoming more important. The film illustrates how the status of North Korean women has developed and how relationships between men and women have changed.

This is Dr. Lee Myung-ja, one of the few North Korean movie experts in South Korea. The researcher of the Pop Culture Research Institute at Dongguk University also serves as a culture columnist to introduce North Korean films to the general public. She tells us why she is spearheading efforts to promote the unpopular genre.

I entered a doctoral course in 2000. While working on a project about North Korean movies, I found I was the only person to apply for the project. North Korean films have developed in their own way for decades after the Korean War, just as South Korean movies have. But there were few study materials about North Korean flicks, if any, and the quality of the materials was very poor. Scholars here tended to use films only to learn about North Korean society, which I found disappointing. Film agencies in South and North Korea may be merged after the two sides are unified. But there was little information about North Korean films available, and I decided to show more interest in them and study them more intensely.

South Korean sociologists and scholars of political science have mostly studied North Korean movies as a means to figure out the society and policies of the communist nation. The first-generation researchers have focused on ideological elements of North Korean films, and Dr. Lee maintains it’s hard to perceive their studies as genuine research of the Northern movies. She says the second-generation researchers, including herself, examine more essential parts of North Korean films, such as stories, genres, actors and actresses, a filmmaking history and shooting techniques. Dr. Lee worked mainly on melodramas about family relationships, and she began to show interest in North Korean films that place particular importance on family. In North Korean movies, the nation’s top leader is described as ‘father,’ the Workers’ Party as ‘mother,’ and ordinary people as ‘children.’ The family structure in the movies drew her attention.

A film usually mirrors various aspects of a society, sometimes the whole society. Viewers follow the storyline while watching a movie, but they also see the houses, furniture, TV sets, a fan and other trivial things appearing in it. Film exchanges between South and North Korea will be difficult, since films show every minor part of society. Not surprisingly, North Korea is worried that its poor, reclusive society will be shown to South Korean citizens through movies. Or North Koreans may be stunned to learn their South Korean counterparts are far better off than they expect. Little wonder North Korea is reluctant to engage in film exchanges with the South. For that reason, I think research of North Korean films is more important.

Films show language, lifestyles and the mindset of people living in a certain period. Noting that they contain all cultural elements, Dr. Lee says film exchanges will lead to cultural exchanges, therefore facilitating the unification process. She hopes South Koreans can gain access to North Korean films more easily, and North Korean researchers can see South Korean movies more conveniently.