It’s been a year since North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s third son Kim Jong-un made his political debut as his father’s heir apparent during the North’s ruling Workers’ Party convention in September last year. The power transition scheme began to take shape in early January 2009 when Kim Jong-il issued a new directive indicating the official designation of his son Jong-un as successor to the Workers’ Party. Later, the nation distributed a propaganda song for the younger Kim, entitled “Footsteps,” and started idolizing him in a quiet move to lay the groundwork for the post-Kim Jong-il regime. After nearly 20 months of these preparations, North Korea named Kim Jong-un as a four-star general in the military and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party at the party convention on September 28, 2010. Two days later, his photo was revealed in the party newspaper Rodong Shinmun. As such, the communist nation is believed to have unveiled its power succession plan. Here’s Jang Yong-seok, senior researcher at the Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, to review North Korea’s power transfer process during the past year.

Kim Jong-un made a public appearance earlier than expected in September last year. He has since engaged in public activities energetically by accompanying his father. It seems that the power transition has been proceeding at a steady pace without major problems. Of course, the North Korean leadership could adjust the pace. Current leader Kim Jong-il is still alive and well, so the leadership doesn’t want to see the son elbowing his way past his father. I think Kim Jong-il himself finds it necessary to control the pace of the power transfer.

Citing data for the parliamentary audit on September 19, the Unification Ministry in Seoul said that Kim Jong-un has apparently secured his support base to some extent and established his presence within the ranks of leadership. Experts note that the junior Kim has accompanied his father in almost all of his public activities. While being groomed to succeed his father, the younger Kim is obviously demonstrating his status as No.2 man in power. In a similar context, Kim Jong-un reviewed military parades alongside his father on the occasions of the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party in October last year and the 63rd anniversary of the North Korean regime this year, which was broadcast live through North Korean Central TV. The project to idolize the presumed successor and accumulating his achievements is also underway.

North Korea has sought to add to Kim Jong-un’s achievements in recent years. For example, the nation carried out economic development campaigns such as the “150-day battle” and the “100-day battle” in 2009 when Kim Jong-un rarely made public appearances, although he had already been nominated as successor. More recently, the term “CNC” representing “computer numerical control” is used in North Korea when referring to the efforts to boost productivity by computerizing local factories. The move is certainly aimed at promoting the image of Jong-un as a competent leader to push for the development of science and technology and lead the economy. It is also notable that North Korea is focused on controlling its society and establishing public order, although these efforts are not considered among the younger Kim’s achievements.

Some speculate that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s recent visits to China and Russia have helped his son establish his own political foothold. North Korean society remained stable even when the top leader was out of town in May and August this year for trips to China and Russia, possibly reflecting that Kim Jong-un has gained control of the nation to some extent. In the meantime, a generational shift is being detected within the North Korean leadership, as Ri Yong-ho, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party and chief of the Korean People’s Army General Staff, and party secretary Choe Ryong-hae have emerged as influential figures in the military and in the party, respectively. Attention is being drawn to a change within the ruling elite after Kim Jong-un’s appearance.

We have to take note of a generational change in North Korea’s leadership structure. Senior figures in their 80s were replaced by 50-and 60-somethings during the party convention in 2010, and a similar transition occurred in mid-and low-level posts, with the emergence of the post-war generation. In central and local regions alike, new faces have taken the place of seniors who were relegated to honorary membership. Also, the party, which had previously been overpowered by the military, has reshuffled its personnel and expanded its presence, which is a remarkable phenomenon. It would be fair to say that the party is even at the forefront of efforts to promote economic cooperation with China.

So, will Kim Jong-un be able to take over power eventually? Mr. Jang says the power transfer will proceed relatively smoothly but the process is still subject to several important factors.

It’s hard to answer definitely at this point, but the possibility of the leadership transition is high, as long as Kim Jong-il can survive for some time. From the viewpoint of ruling elites, it is undesirable that one of them become the country’s leader because they may be at a disadvantage in that situation. With this in mind, they may attempt to share power with one another and maintain the current order by putting up the son of the current leader as the would-be leader. So, the ruling class may support the father-to-son power succession. Nevertheless, the most important factor to influence the leadership transfer is public sentiment. Kim Jong-un is eager to promote himself, referring to CNC and making efforts to feed people, in order to win public support. Even the elites may decide whether or not to support the heir-apparent, depending on whether he can win the hearts of the people. In this vein, public sentiment is highly important.

Diplomatic experts are taking note of the year 2012, the centennial of the birth of North Korea’s late founder Kim Il-sung and the self-declared year of ushering in the so-called strong and prosperous nation. Experts predict Kim Jong-il may begin to govern the nation jointly with his successor Jong-un in earnest next year. That is, the senior Kim will be in charge of diplomacy and the economy, while the younger Kim will be responsible for the military and party projects during the period of transition into the full-fledged Kim Jong-un regime. So, how will North Korea’s power succession process and a shift in the leadership structure influence future inter-Korean relations?

We should be wary of the possibility that a hard-line mood can be formed inside and outside North Korea during the period of power transition. So, it’s hard to expect a major change in inter-Korean relations in the short term. From a broader perspective, however, North Korea needs to enhance cooperation with the outside world in order to gain public support. In particular, South Korea has significant influence on the military, security and the economy in the North. If we consider the possibility of North Korean reform and openness, the two Koreas could promote dialogue and cooperative relations over the long term.

We should be wary of the possibility that a hard-line mood can be formed inside and outside North Korea during the period of power transition. So, it’s hard to expect a major change in inter-Korean relations in the short term. From a broader perspective, however, North Korea needs to enhance cooperation with the outside world in order to gain public support. In particular, South Korea has significant influence on the military, security and the economy in the North. If we consider the possibility of North Korean reform and openness, the two Koreas could promote dialogue and cooperative relations over the long term.


[Interview]Judicial Trainee Publishes Legal Handbook for Defectors
Various books have been published to assist the ever-increasing number of North Korean defectors in their resettlement here in South Korea, such as education and employment. One of them is a “handbook of legal problems for North Korean newcomers” to be issued by a group of judicial trainees. There are several law books for defectors, but this is the first such book to be published by would-be law professionals. Let’s hear from Kwon Jun-seok, who is in his second year in the Judicial Research and Training Center and planned the handbook publication.

This year, I began to show greater interest in the issues concerning North Korean defectors, as I was reading many articles about North Korea. I realized the defector issue is now an international concern and wondered how I could help them. Using my knowledge about law, I thought I could offer practical help to them.

The number of North Korea defectors who have resettled in South Korea has now reached 23-thousand. Rather than providing legal counseling to only a handful of newcomers, Kwon thought it would be more helpful to publish a book to be used by many more defectors. In March this year, he began to gather people studying at the Judicial Research and Training Center who would share their views and started working out the details with ten colleagues in July. They researched cases with the help of counselors working at the Hana Center in northwestern Gyeonggi Province and decided to approach the most difficult legal problems for defectors first.

The most challenging part for defectors is legal procedures, which are starkly different from those in North Korea. Judicial procedures are very short in North Korea since lawsuits are usually settled in public. If a legal problem arises, for instance, the accused is asked to determine which is right in public. And the lawsuit ends quickly. Keeping that in mind, North Korean newcomers tend to file suit even in trivial matters. But court proceedings in South Korea often last for months and even a year or longer. In that process, the defectors are totally stressed out.

It wasn’t easy at all for the prospective law professionals to compile a book because they had to get in contact with many institutions to examine the forms of legal documents despite the tight schedule in their own studies. But they found themselves feeling great about providing help to North Korean expatriates in the field they’re well versed in. The Hana Center showed 50 typical legal problems the defectors face, including divorce proceedings with their North Korean spouses and the lawful methods to remit money to their family members in North Korea. Dividing these problems into different categories, such as family disputes, criminal cases, civil cases and administration, 11 trainees took charge of compiling each section, which also includes questions and answers.

Illustrating real cases, the handbook gives detailed instructions on the proper procedures to settle cases and correct legal documents as well as relevant laws. Other guidebooks have inadequate explanations about such procedures. But users can settle legal problems simply by following the instructions elaborated in this handbook. Also, it shows a sufficient amount of the forms of legal documents. Compared to other books that mention few related regulations, this book collected and compiled a wide range of relevant laws.

The draft of the handbook will be published soon after editorial supervision. The books will then be distributed to the branches of the Hana Center nationwide with support from the Samsung Legal Aid Services. North Korean expatriates will likely receive the books for free around the end of this month.

I hope this book will prove useful for North Korean newcomers when dealing with various problems concerning family relations and employment. While publishing this book, I became more interested in legal problems involving North Korean defectors. I think I will continue pursuing my interest in this area even if I work in other fields. It would be great if I became one of the experts about North Korean defectors in 10 or 20 years.