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Outline |
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Time
and Place |
Feb.
25~28, 2004 (Beijing, China) |
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Representatives |
Lee Soo-hyuk
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Trade |
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Kim Gye-gwan
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs |
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James Kelly
Assistant State Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs |
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Wang Yi
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs |
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Yabunaka Mitoji
Director-General of Asian and Oceanian
Affairs Bureau |
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Alexander Losyukov
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs |
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Outcomes |
Announcement of a 'Chairman's Statement' of seven
articles, the first 'letter of agreement' produced
by the six-party talks
- Chairman's Statement - Agreement on 'Denuclearization
of the Peninsula' and 'Peaceful Coexistence of Participating
States' / stresses the use of 'mutually coordinated
measures' to resolve the crisis
- Agreement to retain the momentum of the talks
by holding the 3rd round of talks with full participation
during the second quarter of 2004 / agreement to
organize a working group meeting to prepare for
the 3rd round of talks |
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Key Issues |
North Korea - stresses
that the U.S. abandon its 'hostile policies'
As
in the 1st round, North Korea continues to claim
that any agreement or pledge by the U.S. would be
meaningless unless it abandons its 'hostile policies'.
- Requests 'U.S.-NK non-aggression treaty', 'acknowledgement
of North Korea sovereignty', 'normalization of U.S.-DRPK
relations', and 'lifting of economic sanctions'
as evidence that the U.S. has abandoned hostile
policies
DRPK focus on: 1) ascertaining U.S. willingness
to back up its non-aggression intentions and ensure
the DRPK regime's security in the form of official
documents and 2) confirming the specific concessions
the U.S. would be prepared to make upon North Korea's
pledge to abandon its nuclear program.
Some
analysts interpret these principles as a conciliatory
gesture by North Korea in that it expressed 'an
actual willingness' to give up its program.
U.S. - demands CVID
of HEU (highly-enriched uranium) program as well
as nuclear materials/ facilities for peaceful
use
The
U.S. responds affirmatively to North Korea request
concerning regime security, raising the possibility
of a future working group meeting to discuss that
end.
However,
it also expands the previous CVID objectives to
include not only the plutonium-based nuclear weapons
program but also the alleged HEU nuclear weapons
program and nuclear materials/ facilities for
peaceful use.
U.S.-NK - failure to arrive
at agreement
North
Korea denies possession of HEU
North
Korea is in a difficult position to abandon the
peaceful use of nuclear energy (i.e., power generation)
owing to its economic depression and limited capacity
to meet electricity demands
Failure
to reach working-level agreements due to continued
U.S.-NK disagreement on the scope of CVID objectives
South Korea - proposes
3-stage process to resolve Crisis
South
Korea proposes a 3-stage process within a cooperative
framework between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea,
which would later form the basis of future six-party
talks.
South
Korea also demonstrates initiative by presenting
energy-aid plans for North Korea's abandonment
of its nuclear program, receiving support from
China/Russia and consent from the U.S. and Japan.
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3+3+3
Stage Process' Proposed by South Korea |
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Stage |
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Joint South Korea/U.S./Japan announcement
on ensuring North Korea regime security |
1st Stage
Words for Words |
Announcement on abandoning nuclear program
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Mutually coordinated measures by the three
parties Pursuing regime security and normalization
of relations
3 Steps of ensuring
regime security
North Korea |
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South Korea/U.S./Japan |
Expression of willingness
to abandon program
Starts dismantling
Finishes dismantling
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↔
↔
↔ |
Expression of willingness
to ensure regime security
Provisional assurance
Finalized assurance |
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2nd Stage
Actions for Actions |
Freezing and dismantling of nuclear program
3 Conditions
for CVID
1)Dismantling must take place as
promptly as possible
2)North Korea must accept inspections
by the international community
3)All forms of nuclear facilities/ materials,
including HEU, must be subject to CVID |
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Establishment of Peace on the Peninsula
(including the resolution of matters such
as terrorist, human rights, and missiles issues)
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3rd Stage |
Resolution of Crisis |
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Assessments |
Progress in working-level
discussions / introduction of an institutional
device to continue the six-party talks
Intensive and concrete negotiations on the requirements
and concessions for each stage of the 3-stage
process / improved working-level efforts by the
U.S. and North Korea (in comparison with the 1st
round)
General
agreement to hold 3rd round of talks / agreement
to introduce an institutional device (i.e., practical
group meetings) to ensure the permanent continuation
of the talks
New North Korea Foreign
Vice-Minister Kim Gye-gwan negotiates with a more
flexible stance
North
Korea replaces the head of its delegation to the
2nd round of talks with a higher-ranking Vice-Minister,
Kim Gye-gwan, who participates in the negotiations
with an 'anything is negotiable' attitude.
U.S. - distrust toward
North Korea, maintains fundamental position
The U.S. continues to state that all North Korea
issues, including its nuclear program, missiles,
conventional weapons, biological/ chemical weapons,
and human rights violations, must be resolved
before any moves to normalize U.S.-NK relations.
※ The U.S. repeatedly stresses that the occasions
of bilateral U.S.-NK contact during the talks
were 'unofficial contacts, not negotiations'.
Differences in opinion
persist between a ‘desperate North Korea’ and
'fundamentalist U.S.‘
During revisions to the final draft of the 2nd
round's Statement, North Korea replaces "a
closer understanding of the other's position"
with "some differences, that may be adjusted
later on" in order to clearly stress the
unacceptability of key U.S. demands (scope of
CVID, etc.).
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1st & 2nd Working Group Meetings |
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1st Working Group Meeting |
Time and place: May 12~14, 2004 (Beijing, China)
The U.S. states willingness to provide "a
broad array of concessions including North Korea's
declassification as a terror-sponsoring state,
on the condition that North Korea completely gives
up its nuclear program"; North Korea retorts
that "the CVID objectives demanded by the
U.S. are humiliating and fit only for nations
that have lost a war". |
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2nd Working Group Meeting |
Time
and place: June 21~22, 2004 (Beijing, China)
The
U.S. maintains that the "North Korea's acknowledgement
of its possession of HEU is the first step to resolving
the crisis', while North Korea takes a more flexible
stance by expressing the willingness to accept 'freezing
the program in a verifiable manner' as a first step
of the CVID process. |
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