North Korea continues to purge senior officials. Most recently, Ryu Kyong, a deputy director the North’s State Security Department, was executed on espionage charges. In March this year, General Ju Sang-seong, the People’s Safety Ministry head, was dismissed for bribery charges. Last year, then-director of the Workers’ Party Planning and Finance Department Pak Nam-gi was purged, along with ex-finance minister Mun Il-bong over a failed currency reform in late 2009, while the ex-minister of railways Kim Yong-sam was also eliminated for involvement in a massive explosion at Yongchon Station in North Pyongan Province in 2004. Some compare the series of purges in Pyongyang to the so-called “Simhwajo Scandal” that occurred in the late 1990s. The scandal refers to a sweeping purge in North Korea between 1997 and 2000 with an aim of solidifying the power base of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. However, Choi Jin-wook, director of the Center for North Korean Studies at the Korea Institute for National Unification, says that the current situation is a little different from that of the late 1990s.

At the time, numerous high officials of the Worker’s Party, the military and the Security Department were purged by Simhwajo, a nationwide network led by the Social Security Ministry. It was a very shocking event since the ministry wasn’t considered very powerful, compared to the party and the Security Department. It was revealed that Jang Song-taek, current administrative director of the Workers’ Party, was behind the massive purge. In a sense, the purge occurred in the process of seizing power, of disrupting an existing order and creating a new order instead within the Kim Jong-il regime. At the time, the purge was carried out collectively and systematically. However, that does not seem to be the case now. The recent series of purges are more about settling public sentiment and individual power struggles. With Kim Jong-il still assuming power, no major unrest has been sensed in the current power structure.

Mr. Choi analyzes the backdrop for the recent purge of high-ranking officials in Pyongyang from various perspectives.

First, the purpose is to ease the public sentiment, as seen in the execution of former finance official Pak Nam-gi. North Korean people are suffering from food shortages and severe economic difficulties. In a bid to avoid responsibility, the top leadership of North Korea is shifting the blame to some senior officials. Secondly, the leadership is sending a warning message to the ruling elite by purging those in power. In the course of preparing for a power succession, it could face internal turmoil or a veiled competition over who will eventually take power. A political cleansing may bring the maximum effect in giving a strong warning against those possibilities.

North Korea is carrying out an extensive restructuring of medium-level officials, too. The mid-level officials in the party, government and the military have been replaced by those in their 30s and 40s, and 40-somethings are employed even in the manager-level posts in specialized sections of the party. The provincial offices of the party are also replacing senior officials aged 60 or older with younger people. In addition, under the ambitious goal of building a strong and prosperous nation by 2012, North Korea seeks to receive economic aid from China, as evidenced in North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s recent trip to China. The North is also spurring efforts to add more to heir-apparent Kim Jong-un’s list of economic achievements.

Kim Jong-il was designated as the official heir-apparent in 1973 or 1974 at the latest, and he was groomed as the successor for the following 20 years. That is, he took firm root as the next leader while his father Kim Il-sung was still alive. On the other hand, Kim Jong-un is much younger and has little experience. He suddenly became the heir when his father Kim Jong-il had health problems. Little wonder the younger Kim is not yet prepared. Also, he hasn’t served many posts, and he hasn’t had any major achievements, either. It must be necessary for him to accumulate experience and achievements.

North Korea has also embarked on the massive renovation work on the Mansudae area in Pyongyang, which is famous for an immense statue of the late North Korean founder Kim Il-sung. Chosun Shinbo, a pro-North Korean newspaper based in Japan, reported that a 45-story residence building, the highest apartment in North Korea, and a park would be set up in the Mansudae region. However, Mr. Choi is skeptical about the current economic situation in the impoverished North.

At present, North Korea places a great emphasis on the economy. For example, the North uses such expressions as “Rice is more important than bullets” and “It’s absolutely necessary to resolve the food problem.” Of course, the expressions are aimed at easing the negative public sentiment. In reality, however, Kim Jong-un has produced few tangible results when it comes to a currency reform and an improvement in people’s livelihoods. I’m doubtful whether the heir apparent-centered system in North Korea is producing any positive results.

Some speculate that there might be conflict between old and new elite groups within the North Korean leadership.

It’s true that various voices are coming out of North Korea. With the appearance of heir-apparent Kim Jong-un, such figures as vice foreign minister Ri Yong-ho and chief of the Reconnaissance Bureau Kim Yong-chol have risen to the surface, while vice chairman of the National Defense Commission O Kuk-ryol and former minister of the People’s Armed Forces O Jin-woo seem to have been expelled from power. That is, there are rising and falling figures. In the meantime, the party is strengthening its power against the military. Up to now, the military has exercised the right to various privileges, including considerable benefits from companies earning foreign currency. Since a party reshuffle last year, however, power has been transferred to the party. As a result, the military is highly tense and the party is making greater efforts to secure new sources of power. In this process, there may be a power struggle between elite groups.

As there have been few improvements both inside and outside North Korea, there is speculation that North Korea is adjusting the pace of a power transition to Kim Jong-un. The theory is supported by the fact that Kim Jong-un, who became the official heir apparent during a party convention last September, failed to enter the National Defense Commission, the most powerful decision-making body in the North, during the session of the Supreme People’s Assembly in April this year.

Until last year, the rapid emergence of Kim Jong-un sparked speculation that the successor would hold real power soon. From the beginning of this year, however, North Korea has stressed national solidarity centering on current leader Kim Jong-il. It doesn’t seem that there is a major change in the basic structure of a power succession to Kim Jong-un, but some factors may influence the speed of the power transfer. The first factor is Kim Jong-il’s health. Secondly, it depends on whether the junior Kim is fully ready to take power from his father and whether he can establish a stable image. The health conditions of the current leader have improved considerably, while the heir apparent is still young and has little experience. If the younger Kim surfaces too quickly, the ongoing efforts toward a power transfer may backfire. I think that is why North Korea is slowing down the leadership transition.

In regards to North Korea’s power succession to Kim Jong-un, former U.S. director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair recently predicted that the process wouldn’t be smooth, saying that there would be bumps along the road. North Korea is pushing for a third-generation hereditary power transfer, which is unprecedented in modern history. It remains to be seen how this scheme will unfold amid the nation’s constant economic difficulties, international isolation and the strained inter-Korean relations.


[Interview] Exhibition of Gaeseong Products
An exhibition at Incheon City Hall displays a variety of goods ranging from kitchen utensils and metal products to clothes and ceramics. At first glance, they look like ordinary products. In fact, all these goods were manufactured by South and North Korea at their joint industrial complex in the North’s border town of Gaeseong. On another side of the exhibition hall, meanwhile, preschoolers holding the hands with their teachers can’t take their eyes off photos featuring North Korean children of their age. Some civic groups carried out support programs for North Korea in cooperation with Incheon City, and the photographs displayed here feature their activities and achievements.

Hi, I’m Kim Hyo-jeong from the Korean Sharing Movement, a group that has been dedicated to humanitarian aid for North Korea since 1996. The picture at the very left shows cute North Korean children whose nutrition conditions improved a great deal after we delivered meals to the Pyongyang Daycare Center in 2003. The next photo shows the provision of 1,000 tons of corn to North Korea in 2009 in collaboration with Incheon City. There is a photo of children at an orphanage in Onseong County in North Hamgyeong Province. We took this picture after sending meals there. Another photo shows that we provided 700 tons of foodstuffs to a food distribution center in Shinuiju together with Incheon City.

The photo exhibition of humanitarian aid for North Korea, in tandem with an exhibition of Gaeseong products, was held for three days beginning June 14. The event was designed with the purpose of promoting public understanding of North Korean aid programs and the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, the symbol of inter-Korean economic cooperation. Seven civic groups that have joined the aid projects and 16 South Korean companies doing business in Gaeseong participated in this event. Here’s Kim Hyo-eun, director of the South-North Exchange and Cooperation Team at the Incheon City Office.

We, South Koreans, are rather unfamiliar with inter-Korean issues, which we do not directly experience in our daily lives. Generally, it is difficult to understand those issues, and sometimes, we don’t properly recognize them. Through these exhibitions, we wanted to show the reality just the way it is and motivate visitors to show more interest in inter-Korean matters.

Personal and household care products, such as the electric range and reasonably-priced clothes with diverse designs, caught the attention of the visitors. They seemed curious about the products from Gaeseong, which they had only heard about before.

...These Gaesong products look really nice. Their brand names are quite familiar to me, but I examined them with greater interest since they were from Gaeseong.
...I looked around at various goods here. The dress over there is the same one I purchased online and actually wore. I was very surprised to discover that the piece was made in North Korea.

In fact, 2010 was a painful year for South Korean firms operating business at the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and civic groups dedicated to North Korea aid. With inter-Korea relations worsening due to the sinking of the Cheonan warship and North Korea’s artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island, access to Gaeseong was restricted and some aid projects were suspended. But they believe that these exhibitions will provide a new opportunity to facilitate business at Gaeseong and North Korean aid programs. Hopefully, the exhibitions will serve as a meaningful venue for keeping public interest in unification issues afloat.